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Sex Trafficking and Global Governance in the
Context of Pacific Mobility
Sally Engle Merry1
The Pacific has long been home to mobile populations, from the early
voyaging Polynesians to Asian immigrants to Europeans, Americans
and Australians. In the latter group, some came as derelicts off ships
and others as missionaries, traders, and owners of plantations and
shipping. Movement was both within islands and between islands and
mainlands. They were always connected by routes of trade and travel,
but who travelled and what happened to them depended a lot on the
particular legal and social conditions of travel and arrival.

Migration has long been fundamental to the nature of Pacific
societies, but the way law regulates migration has important implications
for the immigrant experience and the society that is formed. This
historical framework offers a useful perspective for understanding a
much-discussed contemporary form of movement: travel for sex work.
Understanding sex trafficking through the lens of migration patterns
moves the debate beyond the sex worker/abolitionist battles to see it as
movement that is sometimes voluntary, sometimes coerced, and often a
combination of both. It suggests the futility of preventing movement,
even if coerced, and the importance of the legal status of the migrant
for their ultimate adaptation and the social order they create.
Patterns of migration formed contemporary Hawai‘i and Fiji,
the Pacific places I know best, but in quite different ways (see, for
example, Merry 2000, Merry and Brenneis 2004, Merry 2004). Both
were populated by waves of immigrants, but some came as indentured
Law Text Culture Vol 15 2011 00

187

Merry

workers, some as traders or missionaries, and some as colonial officials.
In Hawai’I, while some were able to become citizens of an independent
island kingdom, others were not accorded citizenship and were expected
to return to their homeland after a stint as contract labourers (Beechert
1985, Merry 2000). Thus, immigrants came under very different legal
statuses. The conditions of movement and the legal and social status
of each group made a big difference to their settlement and long-term
social position.
I will briefly compare the legal arrangements and migratory patterns
of these two places, then consider how this perspective on migration
provides a valuable lens on a contemporary, much debated, form of
movement: trafficking for sex work. The paper considers debates about
how this form of movement is defined and how it can be controlled. In
the context of the long history of mobility and travel, current efforts
to control trafficking seem futile. They underestimate the difficulty of
preventing movement and the appeal of mobility, even if it includes
coercion. Indeed, movement for sex work is in part fueled by the desire
for travel, novel experiences and opportunities, escape from a bad family
or economic situation, or improving one’s situation. These motivations
are consistent with past patterns of migration. Those who are trafficked,
which covers a variety of forms of movement, often move in response
to the desire for a better life as well as in response to direct coercion or
choices made under coercive conditions (Augustin 2007).

The history of Pacific migration suggests that the legal arrangements
of movement and settlement in the new location will have lasting
implications for the traveller. This means that efforts to prevent sex
trafficking are unlikely to stop the flow of people, and arrangements that
provide undesirable legal statuses for victims of trafficking will generate
long-term difficulties for them. Creating a legitimate legal status for
trafficking victims is critically important to improving their conditions.
Simply trying to stop the flow of people coerced into sex work, without
changing the underlying inequalities of wealth and opportunity that
drive mobility, is doomed to failure (see Monzini 2005).
In the Pacific, movement has long been part of family and social life.
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As Ilana Gershon observes in her study of Pacific diasporas, families
move constantly throughout the Pacific despite migration, working
to maintain ties by the exchange of gifts and information. Even in
the sphere of family life, a government’s policies and classifications
play a critical role. As Gershon notes, ‘ … a government’s historical
relationships with dominant minorities are often the most relevant for
understanding a national ethnoscape’ (Gershon 2007: 491). Forms of
racial or class exclusion, and the relations between dominant groups
and minority groups, can shift identities so that, for example, it may be
more salient to hold an identity as a Pacific Islander in Australia than as
a Tongan or Samoan. In Fiji, the status of Indo-Fijian has become more
politically salient in the Indian ancestry population than an identity
based on caste or region of origin in India (Kelly 1994, Lal 1999).
Legal Regulation and Migration to Hawai‘i and Fiji
At one time Fiji and Hawai’i had large agricultural populations ruled
by powerful chiefs (Collier 2004). They were colonised in the late 19th
century by European-descended groups and both developed a thriving
sugar plantation economy based on imported Asian labourers. In each
case, colonial officials formed a coalition with the indigenous people
and excluded the immigrant sugar workers from land and political
power. The workers responded by organising into labour unions and
mobilising politically to improve their lot. By the end of the colonial
era in both places, the people of other nations who came to work the
land more or less outnumbered the indigenous people, and British and
American law and bureaucracy were layered over a system of chiefly
authority (Lal 1999, Kamakau 1961, Fuchs 1983, Kame’eleihiwa 1992).

The duration of the colonial period was similar: the British
controlled Fiji from 1874 until 1970; the Americans ruled Hawai’i
as a colony from 1898 until 1959. Fiji became independent in 1970;
Hawai’i became a US state in 1959. Despite independence, Fiji remains
economically dependent and Hawai’i retains a colonial economic
relationship to the US mainland. Both are neocolonial rather than
postcolonial, in the sense that they are nominally self-governing but
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still economically dependent as they were under colonialism. The
status of Native Hawaiians remains essentially colonial within the state
of Hawai’i where they are excluded from their lands and politically
subordinated in state politics (Cooper and Daws 1990, Denoon 1997,
Silva 2004, Coffman 2009).

Ethnic conflicts in Fiji and Hawai’i varied dramatically during
and after colonialism. In the years following direct colonial control,
they both faced ethnic tension and indigenous nationalism along
with ongoing and unresolved charges of social injustice (see Lal et
al 1993). In Fiji, ethnic Fijians feared economic domination by the
Indo-Fijians even though ethnic Fijians own the vast bulk of the
land in perpetuity. Although Indo-Fijians were elected to political
leadership, ethnic Fijian-led coups quickly deposed them in the name
of indigenous rights and primordial connections to the land. Coups
in 1987 and 2000 excluded elected Indo-Fijians from political power
and allowed ethnic Fijians to retain political control. But this came
at the price of political stability. Ethnic Fijians now feel economically
secondary to the Indo-Fijian community and are seeking affirmative
action to equalise their position. Many Indo-Fijians are leaving the
islands (Kaplan 2004; Lal 1999, 2004).
Hawai’i, in contrast, appears to be a successful multiethnic state.
The descendants of European and Asian plantation workers, Native
Hawaiians, American colonial elites, and mainland US immigrants live
peacefully under a democratically elected government. Some immigrant
groups have achieved political power and economic affluence but
Native Hawaiians are largely a dispossessed and poor minority that is
struggling to recapture their culture, and control over land (Kauanui
2008), while others such as those from the Philippines and the Pacific
Islands are caught at the bottom of the social hierarchy of the state
(Haas 1992; Okamura 1996, 1998, 2000; Okihiro 2009).

The ongoing but unresolved demands for land and sovereignty
in Hawai’i by Kanaka Maoli — Native Hawaiians — have fuelled
an energetic and sometimes angry sovereignty movement since the
1970s (Hasager and Friedman 1994, Tengan 2008). The movement
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seeks to restore political power to Kanaka Maoli through a range of
remedies from independence to a system of reserves, although there
is no consensus within the community about the best path to selfdetermination (see Merry and Brenneis 2004).

Although the political turmoil in Fiji and Hawai’i is usually
understood as primarily ethnic, the causes are economic and political
as much as ethnic. Many are rooted in the legal and institutional
arrangements of land and governance developed during the colonial
era (see Kelly 1994, Beechert 1985, Kaplan 2004, Kame’eleihiwa
1992, Merry 2000). The colonial legal legacies of Hawai’i and Fiji
have contributed to their contemporary political instability and ethnic
turmoil. Comparing the ethnic situation in Hawai’i with that of Fiji
highlights the impact of colonial legal arrangements on the shape of
contemporary ethnic conflict.
The systems of legal regulation of land and citizenship are among
the most salient differences between the two societies. These grew out
of different theories of colonial governance. Hawai’i was colonised
by Americans who sought to privatise the land, Christianise the
Hawaiians, and convert them into free labourers independent of the
chiefs (Kame’eleihiwa 1992, Silva 2004, Osorio 2002). Governance
shifted from a system of chieftains to a constitutional monarchy with
an elected legislative body (Merry 2000). The result was a weakening
of the chiefs, the massive loss of land by Native Hawaiians and its
purchase by Americans and Europeans whites in the 19th century, and
the gradual economic and social marginalisation of Hawaiians. By the
middle of the 20th century, most Hawaiians lived in remote villages
and poor urban neighbourhoods. Following the model of privatised
land and capitalist development, the sugar planters imported labourers
from China and Japan to plant and harvest the cane. In the 1880s,
these Asian labourers were effectively excluded from citizenship by
the increasingly powerful Americans (Beechert 1985, Lal et al 1993,
Okihiro 1991). When Hawai’i became a US territory, however, the
Hawai’i-born children of the Chinese and Japanese became US citizens
with the right to vote and, in the 20th century, they gradually acquired
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political power while Hawaiian political power diminished (Okihiro
2009, Merry 2000).

Fiji, on the other hand, was governed by a British regime that sought
to protect and isolate the Fijians in villages while maintaining the power
of the chiefs and Fijian control over land (Thomas 1994, 1997; Samson
1998). This meant that the vast majority of the land remained under the
control of Fijian villages and chiefs. The Australian white-owned sugar
companies imported people from India to work the plantations fields
but, like the US white planters in Hawai’i, saw the Indians as labour
units rather than citizens (Kelly 1994). They dealt with the demand
for political participation by creating a system of separate communal
voting for seats designated by ethnic identity.
While Hawai’i and Fiji developed quite different colonial systems
for allocating land and political power, they both sustained tripartite
divisions of colonial authorities, indigenous peoples, and immigrant
sugar plantation labourers who were viewed as coolie labourers rather
than potential citizens. Although not expected to stay, these labourers
put down roots and settled. Hawaiian leaders endlessly sought ‘citizen’
labour instead of ‘coolie’ labour — workers whites from Portugal, even
Norway, rather than Chinese, Japanese, or Filipino workers. In time the
population of immigrant workers came to equal or outnumber Native
Hawaiians and Fijians (Merry 2000).
But, there are important differences in the two island groups and
these were shaped by Christianity, colonialism, capitalism, literacy, land
privatisation and electoral democracy which combined to form quite
different constellations. In Hawai‘i, under the influence of missionaries
and the pressures to release land for plantations, the government
privatised land owned by chiefs and commoners. The land division, or
Mahele, of 1848 resulted in massive land loss for the Hawaiian people,
particularly the commoners (Kame’eleihiwa 1992). By the 1860s,
much of the arable land had been converted into white-owned sugar
plantations. In Fiji, by contrast, the colonial government protected
Fijian land rights so that the vast majority of land is held collectively by
lineages. Moreover, to protect Fijian lands and culture, and following
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widespread British colonial practices , voting was specified by ethnicity
with seats designated for particular ethnic groups (Lal 1999). The results
have been a deep social divide with much less social blending among
ethnic communities in Fiji than in Hawai’i.

Hawai’i has a more fluid and less racially divided society than
Fiji, but it is by no means free of racism or persistent racial/ethnic
inequalities (Takaki 1983, Okamura 2000, Okihiro 2009, Trask
1993). Fijians retained their cultural identity and political power more
extensively than Native Hawaiians but at the price of alienating their
substantial Indo-Fijian population. While Japanese-Americans have
become politically and economically powerful in Hawai’i, Indo-Fijians
have been less able to translate their economic success into political
power and consequently many of the more highly educated Indo-Fijians
have chosen to emigrate (Lal 2004).
Overall, the major patterns of migrant labour movement in Fiji
and Hawaii are parallel, but the contemporary social formation is
quite different because of significant variations in land ownership
and political representation. The legal status of each immigrant had
long-term effects on the present situation (Merry and Brenneis 2004).

This comparison highlights the role played by law in allocating
control over land and power, and in constructing ideologies of
difference that render the system coherent and legitimate. Over time,
the law defined Indo-Fijians as unequal members of society and Asian
Hawaiians as members. The long-term effect has been a pattern of
exclusion and out-migration for Indo-Fijians and a gradual increase
in political and economic power for at least some Asian-Americans in
Hawai’i. The legal definition of status was a central mechanism in the
creation of the colonial and postcolonial social order. Law’s effects come
through its capacity to regulate, to establish identities and belonging,
and in the resources it affords — or denies — communities for their own
use in managing conflict and shaping local sociality. Law is embodied
also in objects, records, archives, briefs, systems of land measurement,
and ways of regulating voting that constitute a taken-for-granted world,
now transposed into the objects of everyday life and interaction.
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As this comparison indicates, while migration was fundamental to
the constitution of these Pacific societies, the implications of movement
for different groups varied greatly. The legal arrangements of movement
and arrival had a significant impact on social inequalities and divisions
that emerged over time. These issues parallel the contemporary legal
regulation of sex trafficking and deserve more consideration than they
receive in much of the anti-trafficking movement.
Regulating Sex Trafficking
With the increase in migration and globalisation in the late 20th and
early 21st centuries, a particular form of migration has taken centre
stage: the trafficking of women for sex work. Concern about bonded
labour and child labour has increased as well, although much of the
focus on trafficking zeroes in on sexual exploitation (Miller 2004).
This is not a new problem, of course. It has been taking place for a long
time. Despite laws against white slavery being passed early in the 20th
century, the rate of trafficking seems to have increased dramatically
in the post-Cold War era of globalisation, along with rising global
inequality, the economic collapse of parts of the former Soviet Union,
and the work of organised crime networks (Monzini 2005).
While people may migrate for sex work and other kinds of work, in
practice it is hard to separate sex work migrants from labour migrants
since a migrant may intend to take one kind of work and find herself in
another, or she might move between sex work and other forms of work
depending on circumstances (Augustin 2007). The line between sex
work migrants, and victims of sex trafficking is vague and ambiguous.
It can also be difficult to distinguish between voluntary and coerced
migration since people move under varying degrees of coercion. Sex
trafficking is not easily distinguished from smuggling, forced labour
migration, or travelling as bonded or contract labour as the plantation
workers in Fiji and Hawai’i did in the19th century (Takaki 1983,
1989). Traffickers may be part of organised crime networks or they may
be relatives or even family members from poor villages. It is also not
unusual for sex workers themselves to become involved in trafficking
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as they get older (Warren 2007).

Attention to the problem of trafficking has risen dramatically since
the 1990s. Although there have been many calls to identify the size
of problem, the cited numbers can vary from a few hundred thousand
to millions. The US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report
(TIP Report) for 2010 estimates the number of adults and children in
forced labour, bonded labour and forced prostitution at 12.3 million
globally. The TIP Report lists 49,105 identified victims and 4166
successful trafficking prosecutions in 2009 (TIP Report 2010: 7), but
does not explain the discrepancy between the three sets of figures. For
the Asia-Pacific region, the TIP Report says there are three victims
per every 1000 inhabitants (2010: 7), which implies the total number
of victims is knowable and known.

Estimated numbers of victims are difficult to ascertain and depend
on how you define trafficking. Trafficking generally refers to movement
by force, fraud, and coercion for commercial sex, or if a person is induced
to perform the sex act if under 18 years, or if a person is subjected to
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage or slavery. The TIP
report also says that a person need not be physically transported to
be a trafficking victim, but can be considered trafficked if there is
exploitation of labour (2010: 8). Clearly, the term covers a wide variety
of labour conditions.

The field of sex trafficking is dominated by a contentious debate
over prostitution. There are two international coalitions of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) working on sex trafficking.
The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW, www.
catwinternational.org) condemns prostitution as a violation of women’s
bodies, persons and rights, while the Global Alliance Against Traffic
in Women (GAATW, www.gaatw.org; see GAATW 2007) sees sex
work as a form of work and advocates better working conditions and
protections for those providing it. While feminists occupy both sides
of this divide, the CATW tends to include conservative and religious
groups and, the GAATW, public health advocates seeking to manage
sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS. Focusing on the
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dynamics of movement and the legal status of migrants/trafficking
victims shifts the debate away from these entrenched positions and
opens up new issues.

Two systems of law and monitoring currently endeavour to regulate
international trafficking. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, generally
referred to as the Palermo Protocol (www.uncjin.org/Documents/
Conventions), was developed within the United Nations system
while the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 2000 (TVPA) originated
in the US Congress. Both date from 2000, although the Palermo
Protocol did not come into force until 2003. The Palermo Protocol
has a crime control orientation and is part of an effort to control
transnational organized crime. It is attached to a major international
crime convention, the Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, and is a multilateral treaty written under the auspices of the
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. By 2010, 142
states had ratified the protocol which, as a multilateral convention, is
binding only on those that ratify it.
In the Palermo Protocol, Article 3(a) defines trafficking as the
movement of people intended for the purpose of exploitation:
… the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt
of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person for the purposes of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms
of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

It further states that the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall
be considered ‘trafficking in persons’ even if this does not involve any
of the means outlined above. Yet it is often difficult to differentiate
the two kinds of migrants since some may come to work and end up
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in prostitution, or move in and out of prostitution and other forms of
labour. Moreover, since their status is ambiguous and such movements
are generally illegal it is hard to confidently estimate the number of
victims affected.
Initial work on trafficking focused on sex trafficking and has
recently expanded to human trafficking more generally. Although sex
trafficking remains the central concern of both legislation and activism
at the national and global level, it is only a subgroup of the much larger
population of people being trafficked for labour, slavery, debt bondage,
and other forms of unfree labour.

Sex trafficking is commonly represented by the image of a young
girl sold by impoverished parents to a criminal network, or kidnapped
and sold from hand to hand, who ends up in a brothel in a large city
where she disappears into a world of sex work and services to thirty men
a night. Such stories have elicited a rescue network active in invading
brothels, seizing women and putting them into rescue homes. In some
situations, the rescuers also try to repatriate the women. However, the
situation as presented is far more complicated.

Research I have done, in India with Vibhuti Ramachandran as well
as in other parts of the world, suggests that while this is occasionally
what happens to women who end up in brothels, there are many
other scenarios as well (see Agustin 2007). Many women who go into
prostitution are seeking a better life or to escape from an intolerable
one, such as marriage to abusive husbands, or the prospect of starvation
unless they leave their community. Some may leave for the adventure
and the money they can earn, for example, we interviewed a woman
in Kolkata who left high school just before graduation, went with her
boyfriend to Pakistan and the Gulf States to do sex work, and then
returned home to persuade a friend to go with her on another trip.
Technically, this is trafficking, although it was probably not experienced
as such.
In Indian villages, a woman may be introduced to the sex trade
by relatives, neighbours or friends and, after working in commercial
sex, may have the opportunity to improve her situation. As Prabha
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Kotiswaran shows in Kolkata, some brothels cater to trafficked women
while others rely more on local women (2008). Women can gradually
become property owners which they rent to other sex workers. Some
who become brothel owners may even run trafficking networks
themselves.

While rescue through brothel raids may seem an appealing
solution, raids are difficult. For example, in India prostitution is legal
so rescuers must target minors and non-consenting adults. Brothel
raids should only rescue women who have not consented, but this is
hard to determine, particularly in the turmoil of the raid. One solution
is to focus on ‘rescuing’ children, but the age of young people may
be disputed as they typically lack reliable documentation of age. To
determine a girl’s age NGOs in Kolkata rely on bone ossification tests
and a doctor’s certification to verify the truth of the test, however,
such tests cannot precisely pinpoint age. Women placed in rescue
homes sometimes escape and return to sex work or they may be held
in prison-like conditions to prevent them returning to sex work. Even
after being repatriated to another country, many return, usually due
to the same pressures that persuaded them to move in the first place
(Warren 2010). This tendency to return does not mean that the women
would not prefer a different kind of work; they may return because sex
work is the best option available given their circumstances.
A few months before the Palermo Protocol was finished, the US
Congress passed the TVPA, which established a funding mechanism
for anti-trafficking NGOs around the world and the production of an
annual report on the efforts of other countries to control trafficking.
This report, the Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report), has been
published annually since 2001 and is available on the internet (www.
state.gov/g/tip). The TVPA emphasises protection, prosecution and
prevention, but its major emphasis is on prosecution and the current
head of the office managing the program in the US State Department
has a background as a prosecutor.
The TIP Report was originally envisioned as a way for the US
to encourage source countries to stem the flow of trafficked victims
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into the US. The law was passed in conjunction with a renewal of the
Violence Against Women Act and built on experience in combating
domestic violence and sexual assault in the US (Warren 2007). Like
the Palermo Protocol, it has a crime control emphasis although it has
increasingly stressed the human rights of victims as well.

In addition to publishing the TIP Report, the US Department of
State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons funds
many anti-trafficking NGOs. Despite its origins in concerns about
women trafficked for sex work, it has increasingly focused on forms
of forced labour. During the Bush presidency, 2000-2008, the office
also took a strong anti-prostitution approach so that, even in 2010, my
interviews in India indicated that only anti-trafficking organizations
were asked by US State Department officials to provide information
on their activities for the TIP Report whereas sex-worker NGOs were
not consulted.

Since the TIP Report was first published in 2001, it has become a
tool for pressuring countries for failure to act more strongly, particularly
in the area of prosecution of traffickers. It does this through shaming
and encouragement as well as the application of sanctions. Some
commentators, even those critical of its unilateral approach, credit the
TIP Report with a significant increase in action by governments to
control trafficking (Gallagher 2011).
The TIP Report ranks countries in three tiers according to
compliance with a set of minimum standards established in the
TVPA — Tier 1 indicates the most compliant. A fourth tier, the
Tier 2 Watch List, was added in 2004. Countries that fall into Tier 3
face the possibility of sanctions by the US while a 2008 amendment
consigns those ranked in the Tier 2 Watch List for two consecutive
years, beginning in 2009, to Tier 3 for the next year unless there
is a presidential waiver (TIP Report 2010: 25). Sanctions include
withdrawal of non-humanitarian aid, although these may be waived
for security and other concerns. Until 2010, the US did not rank itself
but, in response to global complaints, has now done so. In 2011 the
US was ranked as Tier 1.
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Among Pacific countries in 2010, Papua New Guinea was the
only country in Tier 3 but Fiji was placed in the Tier 2 Watch List
along with Kiribati, the Maldives, Micronesia and the Philippines;
Indonesia, Palau and Timor-Leste were Tier 2. Like most other rich
countries, Australia and New Zealand were ranked in Tier 1. India
has been on the Tier 2 Watch List since 2004 and was classified in
the same status for 2010 but upgraded to Tier 2 in 2011. According
to the report and discussions with the office in the State Department,
India’s rank is primarily based on a lack of government efforts to control
labour trafficking, especially bonded labour, rather than sex trafficking
(TIP Report 2010: 171-2). The report notes that there were very few
convictions for bonded labour cases but that there was greater success
in the area of sex trafficking, although sex trafficking prosecutions and
convictions took place only in Mumbai and Andra Pradesh (TIP Report
2010: 173). Overall, it noted several government programs such as the
Anti-Human Trafficking Units of the police and progressive laws, but
cited a lack of implementation of these laws and policies.
The TVPA and the TIP Report arose not from international
discussion as the Palermo Protocol did, but from concerns about
trafficking into the US. Congress determined what it considered
good practices for controlling trafficking and established these as the
standards against which other countries were to be judged. There are
significant differences between the definitions of trafficking in the
TVPA and international protocols (Gallagher 2011). In contrast to
earlier reports, however, the 2010 TIP Report makes frequent reference
to the Palermo Protocol as well as US standards.
In the TIP Report tier rankings depend on the extent to which
governments already comply with the TVPA’s minimum standards for
the elimination of trafficking or are seen to be making significant efforts
to comply with them. Tier placement is based more on government
efforts than the size of the problem (TIP Report 2010: 20). Such
efforts include passing anti-trafficking laws, implementing these laws
through prosecution, providing victims with protection and services
and not harming their rights, dignity or well-being, developing victim
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identification systems, imposing criminal penalties on traffickers,
curbing practices that contribute to forced labour migration, and
developing partnerships with NGOs to provide victims’ services such
as health care and counselling (TIP Report 2010: 20-1). Countries that
are making efforts but have a large or increasing number of victims,
have not provided evidence of improved efforts, or have not fulfilled
commitments made the previous year, are classified as Tier 2 Watch
List.

The core principles are prosecution, measured in part by number of
convictions of traffickers, protection of victims through collaboration
between law enforcement and service providers, and prevention through
public awareness and a variety of policies such as enforcement of labour
laws, elimination of restrictive visa practices, and increase in criminal
and civil penalties for companies that rely on forced labour. The 2010
TIP Report added a fourth category, partnerships — collaborations
between government and NGOs in the area of human rights, labour
and employment, health and services, and law enforcement (TIP Report
2010: 12-15). Although this is a relatively broad range of criteria, the
report focuses largely on prosecution and law enforcement approaches
to the problem. Further, while the report emphasises the importance
of victim protection and assistance, a core concern is the number of
trafficking prosecutions and convictions as well as the overall quality
and impact of counter-trafficking law enforcement efforts (TIP Report
2010: 6). There is relatively little focus on regularising the status of
the trafficking victim and allowing her to stay in the country where
she is working.

The process of data collection, originally rather thin, has improved
over the years, relying both on government and NGO data collected
by embassies and sent to Washington where the tier rankings are
established (Gallagher 2011). However, the report still relies very
extensively on statistical information (numbers of convictions, shelters,
training programs) rather than more qualitative information on, for
example, the nature and impact of support for victims (Gallagher
2011: 15, 20). There is little discussion of the limitations of the data or
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the difficulty of counting trafficking victims and activity. The report
focuses on what is measurable such as laws passed, convictions, number
of trainings, number of shelters, number of special police units, etc.,
rather than the unmeasurable quality of life of victims or of poor
communities from which people are trafficked.
Nevertheless, this partial information is translated into apparently
objective tier rankings, producing a ‘truth’ of the status of trafficking
in each country. There are clearly politics involved, with several
of the 2010 Tier 3 countries such as Cuba, Iran, and North Korea
already viewed as problematic by the US, although friends such as
Saudi Arabia were found in Tier 3 as well. Despite the efforts of US
embassies in various countries to put the best spin on the practices
they observe, decisions are ultimately made in Washington within
the State Department. Countries that refuse to cooperate in providing
information are downgraded for failure to gather and share information
about their efforts. Arguing that the quality of government is relevant
to these rankings, the 2010 report shows a correlation between low
tier rankings and poor performance on Freedom House’s indicators
of freedom and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception
Index (TIP Report 2010: 28-9).

The TIP Report measures, primarily, law enforcement efforts
and rates of prosecution, although it also advocates victim/witness
protection and prevention. It does not foreground efforts to improve
the lives of poor women and low status individuals, those typically most
likely to be trafficked. Some NGOs in India, for example, focus on
village vigilance committees to determine if young women have gone
missing, or provide skills training for the children of sex workers, yet
these would not be activities recognised in the TIP report. The TIP
Report defines the solution to the trafficking problem as a criminal
justice one and locates the responsible parties within the state. It is the
police and judiciary that are targeted as responsible for stemming the
practice and the strategies that are encouraged are the passing of laws
and training for police and judges to recognise and deal with trafficking.
Countries that pass anti-trafficking laws improve in the rankings. The
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focus is on punishing traffickers rather than recuperating victims.

Thus, the TIP Report articulates a particular theory of how to
diminish trafficking. It focuses on the role of organised crime and
traffickers, seeking to penalise their activities rather than working to
diminish the vulnerability of potential trafficked victims or providing
them alternative modes of livelihood. It imagines the problem of
trafficking as one of organised crime rather than poverty and inequality
and does not touch on forms of inequality based on class, caste, race
and gender that often lie behind patterns of coercion into migration
and forced labour. Moreover, it assumes that movement into sex work
is unwilling, thus ignoring what Laura Marie Augustin argues is a
widespread desire to move, travel and have new experiences among
people in all social classes (2007). This produces tourism among the
wealthy but migration for sex work or other forms of labour among
the poor.
The focus on prosecution has some negative impacts on ‘rescued
women’ who are often important as witnesses against traffickers. I have
heard different accounts of the situation of trafficked women and their
legal role as witnesses against traffickers, ranging from some NGOS
who say women are eager to testify and open to being trained to speak
in court to others who say victims are held against their will in safe
houses for long periods of time pending trials. Although trafficking
interventions seek to protect victims from arrest for sex work, there
is nevertheless a tendency to hold them as witnesses to prosecute the
trafficker. The option of staying in the country may depend on testifying
against traffickers. In the US and Europe, women can get visas to
stay a few months or a year if they cooperate with the prosecution of
traffickers. Such visas are usually short term, hard to get, and dependant
on cooperation with the police.
As the examination of migration in the Pacific in the 19th century
indicated, however, the availability of a legitimate legal status could
contribute significantly to allowing the trafficked victim to change
her life. Even rescued women often return to the brothels or disappear
from shelters. Recognising the forces that drove them to leave in the
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first place, and providing alternative ways to live in the receiving
country, would recognise the fact of movement and the possibilities
offered women to forge a new life. The experience of Pacific migration,
and the variety of ways immigrants have moved from coercive
immigrant roles to citizenship and belonging, provides insights into
how movement occurs and what legal and social conditions foster
belonging. Stigmatised identities and a lack of access to full citizenship
status clearly inhibit absorption and collaboration. The more risky and
coerced the departure, and the less welcoming the receiving society,
the less likely the immigrant or trafficked person will be able to find
a stable place in the receiving society. Those who design trafficking
interventions, particularly if they see prostitution as inherently
exploitative and criminal, would clearly help victims more if they
adopted a wider perspective on migration and coercion and expanded
the possibilities of resettlement.
Conclusion
Current efforts to control sex trafficking involve effort to regulate and
control a space of migration not so different from that fuelling past
migrations to Hawai’i and Fiji. Then, as now, migrations are sometimes
voluntary, sometimes carried out under various forms of coercion such
as poverty, state-arranged labour transfers, capture and ‘blackbirding’.
They may be inspired by the desire for opportunity and novelty, with
or without coercion.
Not all migrants in the 19th century Pacific remained poor. Japanese
Americans have become economically and politically powerful in
Hawai’i, for example, even though the government of Hawai’i sought
white immigrants over Asian ones in the 1880s. When Hawai’i become
a US Territory in 1898, those born in the Territory became citizens,
regardless of race or immigrant history. This openness to membership
in the polity allowed more diversity in the political leadership of the
islands and ultimately diminished the exclusive economic and political
control of the small group of whites who ran the businesses and politics
in the early 20th century (see Fuchs 1961).
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The pressure to move was great in the 19th century and it has not
abated in the 21st century. Such movements will continue as people
seek new opportunities, experiences, and escapes. The conditions
of movement are shaped by the regulatory systems in which people
move: their access to legitimate statuses on arrival, the availability of
reasonably priced forms of movement, and some protection from abuse
by those who control the means of travel. The focus on trafficking is
both too narrow and too punitive to stem the flow or ameliorate its
abuses. It needs to move toward greater acceptance of movement and
toward making movement and settlement legal and open rather than
illegal and clandestine. Improved access to work visas, legal modes of
movement, and settlement and citizenship programs could contribute
to stemming the trafficking problem. The TIP Report includes these
remedies but does not emphasise them.

Efforts to control sex trafficking are not likely to succeed any more
than efforts to prevent other forms of illegal migration. Some states use
this concern to monitor and close borders and prohibit the movement of
people. Indeed, the enthusiasm for regulating sex trafficking arises from
a conjunction of humanitarian desire to aid apparently innocent young
women from unwanted sex and state desires to strengthen borders and
control the movements of people, drugs and other goods. An historical
view of migration and settlement provides a useful way of thinking
about the difficulty of regulating trafficking through prosecution.
Interest in travel and the desire for change will likely continue. In the
meantime, efforts to control trafficking can be harmful to the very
people they are meant to protect.
Notes
Sections of this paper come from the Introduction to Sally Engle Merry and
Don Brenneis eds 2004 Law and Empire in the Pacific: Hawai’i and Fiji School
of Advanced Research Press Santa Fe NM. Sally Engle Merry’s research
on Hawai’i was generously supported by grants from the National Science
Foundation, Law and Social Sciences and Cultural Anthropology Programs.
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